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ADDING ANOTHER PIECE TO THE FINANCING
PUZZLE: THE ROLE OF REAL PROPERTY
SECURED DEBT
Alex M. Johnson, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
At first blush, a secured debt system appears to be inequitable.' Se-
cured debt permits the debtor to grant its secured creditors priority over
other unsecured creditors.2 Thus, in the event of debtor insolvency, the
secured creditors have the right to take as much of the collateral or "se-
curity" as necessary to satisfy their claims before the unsecured creditors
can'take anything.' A system disallowing secured debt would require all
creditors to share pro rata in the debtor's assets in the event of debtor
insolvency.4
Realizing the facial inequity of secured debt, scholars have advanced
numerous theories to justify its existence and widespread use.5 While
many theories purport to explain the role of secured financing, none at-
tempts to explain the role of real property secured financing.6 The se-
cured debt puzzle cannot, however, be pieced together successfully unless
the role that real property secured debt plays in financing transactions is
factored into the analysis of secured debt.
This Article briefly describes the secured debt puzzle, the debate
that has developed concerning its existence, and the theories legal schol-
* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. The Author would like to
thank Thomas Bergin, William Eskridge, Paul Stephen, William Stuntz and Jay Westbrook for
their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this Article.
1. Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priority Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J.
1143, 1147 "(1979).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See, eg., D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON SECUR-
ITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 361-67 (1984); Jackson & Kromnan, supra note 1;
Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49
(1982); Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L.
Rtv. 901 (1986).
6. See Scott, supra note 5, at 902. Real property secured financing differs from personal
property secured financing in that the collateral or "security" is real property, as opposed to
personal property.
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ars have developed to explain the existence and use of secured financing.
It then explores the role that real property secured debt plays in solving
the secured credit puzzle by raising and answering the question of how, if
at all, real property secured debt impacts personal property secured debt.
By examining the role that monitoring7 plays in real property security
interests, as opposed to personal property security interests, another
piece is added to the puzzle.
Finally, this Article explains the need for and use of secured debt in
light of the existence and widespread use of real property security inter-
ests. By drawing upon examples provided by real property secured debt,
the Article concludes that secured debt serves an important signaling
function.8 Contrary to previously considered approaches, however, this
Article shows that the signal provided by real property secured debt is
not solely or primarily for the benefit of the creditors; real property se-
cured debt also provides an important signal to creditors' investors.
II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT THEORIES OF SECURED DEBT
The role of secured debt in financing transactions is puzzling. Many
commentators have asked, "What purposes, whether benign or malig-
nant, does security serve?" 9 Specifically, scholars have questioned the
preference given to some creditors over others for personal property se-
curity. 10 In the intellectual pursuit to justify and explain the function of
secured debt, legal scholars have advanced many theories.1
Proponents of the conventional theory 12 justify the preferential
treatment lenders give to secured creditors by arguing that a secured
credit system benefits debtors because it increases the amount of credit
available to the debtor.1 3 Under this theory, if lenders did not demand
security, high-risk debtors would be forced to pay prohibitive interest
rates or would be denied credit altogether. 4 Under a secured credit sys-
tem, creditors can reduce the unacceptably high risks of default by de-
manding adequate security. Thus, creditors can extend credit to debtors
7. "Monitoring" is a strategy used by creditors to police the debtor's conduct after the
loan has been made. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1150. Creditors monitor the
debtor to minimize the risk of misbehavior. Id.
8. "Signaling" is a mechanism used by debtors to ensure creditors of their credit-worthi-
ness as debtors. Scott, supra note 5, at 906.
9. Scott, supra note 5, at 901; see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
10. See Scott, supra note 5, at 901. Secured financing is discriminatory in the sense that it
gives preference to secured creditors over unsecured in the event of the debtor's insolvency. Id.
11. Id.
12. See, eg.. J. VAN HoRNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 536 (3d ed. 1974).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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who may otherwise be denied access to the credit market.15
The "zero-sum game" analysis' 6 discredits the conventional justifi-
cation by showing that secured credit is a zero-sum game in which any
benefits accruing to the secured creditors as a result of their security in-
terest are offset by the increased costs to unsecured creditors. 7 Simi-
larly, any cost-savings debtors realize by incurring secured debt are offset
by the higher interest rates debtors pay for unsecured debt. Moreover,
zero-sum game analysts allege that the high transaction costs debtors in-
cur to create a security interest may cause the debtor's aggregate cost of
financing to be higher in a world that allows secured credit, than in one
that prohibits secured credit. 8
A third theory explaining the role of secured debt in financing trans-
actions is put forth by "monitorists." Professors Thomas Jackson and
Anthony Kronman, the most prominent proponents of monitoring, use
an efficiency argument to explain the role of secured financing. They
argue that able monitors extend unsecured credit because they are effec-
tively able to monitor the debtor for misbehavior, while less efficient
monitors require a security interest to compensate them for their inabil-
ity to monitor the debtor effectively. 9 Jackson and Kronman's theory
has been criticized because it fails to explain the empirical facts that
many unsecured creditors are inadequate monitorists and that the most
able monitors frequently require security.2°
Finally, Professor Robert Scott, one of the most prominent "rela-
tionalists," advances a theory of secured financing based on relational
contract theory.2' The relational model of secured financing relies on the
15. Id.
16. The term "zero-sum game" was used by Scott, supra note 5, at 902 (citing Schwartz,
Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 10-11, 18-21 (1981)).
17. See A. SCHWARTZ & R. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 556-59 (1982); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 7-11, 18-21.
18. Scott, supra note 5, at 902.
19. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1158-61.
20. Levmore, supra note 5, at 53.
21. Scott, supra note 5. A relational contract is defined as:
A contract is relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing impor-
tant terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations. Such definitive obligations
may be impractical because of inability to identify uncertain future conditions or
because of inability to characterize complex adaptations adequately even when the
contingencies themselves can be identified in advance.
Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (1981). Long-
term contracts are more likely than short-term agreements to fit this conceptualization, but
temporal extension per se is not the defining characteristic. Id. Relational contracts differ
from complete contingent contracts in that the complete contingent contract assumes complete
risk allocation ex ante; in other words, performance standards are reduced to specific obliga-
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creditor's use of a blanket or floating lien 22 pursuant to Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.23 The floating lien gives the creditor exclu-
sive control over the debtor's financing needs because it grants the credi-
tor priority in all the debtor's assets including after acquired assets.24
The exclusive control given to the creditor, and the resultant cooperative
behavior that must take place between the debtor and creditor establishes
the relational financing device by which each party seeks to maximize the
joint return from the venture. 2 Because both the debtor and the secured
creditor are committed to the success of the venture, all creditors, includ-
ing the unsecured creditors, benefit.
Interestingly enough, none of the above theories considers the role
of real property secured financing. Although the relational model cannot
be faulted for ignoring real property secured debt because conventional
mortgages are not relational contracts,26 the other theories purport to
tions. Id at 1092. In the complete contingent contract, parties are assumed to be able to
allocate all the risks ex ante, because they are presumed to have access to complete informa-
tion about all the future contingencies and the relevant legal rules that could affect their rela-
tionship. See Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of
Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 n.l1 (1983).
22. A floating lien "floats from one bit of collateral to another, and may first secure one
debt and then another." Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L. REv. 838, 839 (1959).
23. U.C.C. § 9-109 (1989); see Scott, supra note 5, at 903.
24. See U.C.C. § 9-204. Article 9 contains an exception for purchase money security in-
terests. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4); Scott, supra note 5, at 913.
25. Scott, supra note 5, at 916-19. As Professor Scott notes:
The purposes behind this elaborate mechanism are revealed by evidence that se-
cured creditors and debtors form a relational contract in order to finance growth
opportunities or prospects. Secured creditors invest substantiil resources in directing
debtor actions toward optimal development of the financing venture. Since these
services are not separately priced at the time of contracting, the parties enter into
relational credit contracts in which the creditor gains the exclusive option over the
financing venture in exchange for the obligation to aid in its full development. The
creditor's interest in cooperating ex post is maintained by the single fact that the
loans cannot feasibly be repaid except out of the proceeds of the venture itself. The
debtors [sic] commitment to the joint interest of the venture is itself enforced through
the elaborate security mechanisms generated by this specialized industry.
Id. at 951.
One significant mechanism for achieving the debtor's commitment is that the debtor offers
its assets as a "hostage" to the creditor in order to grant the creditor leverage over the debtor's
assets. As noted by Professor Scott, "The hostage imagery was introduced into bargaining
analyses by Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REv. 281, 300 n.17 (1956)."
Scott, supra note 5, at 928 n.91; accord Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, 73 AM. EON. Rnv. 519, 522-26 (1983) (discussing use of hostages in con-
temporary contracting).
26. For a discussion of the conventional, non-relational nature of the typical mortgage
transaction and the relational nature of certain new financing devices, see A. Johnson, The
Recent Development and Limited Use of Relational Contracts in Real Estate Financing: The
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deal with secured debt, but specifically limit their analyses to personal
property security.
Real property secured debt must be analyzed in order to evaluate
fully the role of security in debtor-creditor relationships. The land upon
which a business is built may be: (1) the one asset for which monitoring
plays little or no role because land is immobile;27 (2) the one asset that
may appreciate in value to reflect the capitalization provided by the fi-
nancing;" and, (3) the one significant asset that is tied up or secured by a
mortgage which gives the mortgagee priority over all secured and un-
secured creditors in the mortgaged property.29 This super security inter-
est may motivate, in some fashion, creditors' efforts to obtain security in
other assets held by the debtor.30 At the very least, the existence of the
mortgage, or the option of taking a mortgage on real property if no prior-
ity mortgages 31 exist, affects a subsequent creditor's use of secured debt.
It may be nothing more than the absence of the creditor's ability to take a
super security interest in real property that motivates him or her to ac-
cept a floating lien or other collateral for the debt.
Yet, a priority mortgage or super security interest in the property
must be a choice available to the creditor at the time the debtor-creditor
relationship is established. This Article establishes that the use or the
inability to use real property secured debt impacts the creditor's choices
regarding the type of security interest taken by the creditor in the
debtor's assets.32 Thus, it is impossible to discuss the role of secured debt
without an analysis of the role of real property secured debt and its inter-
action with personal property secured debt. No game can take place,
including a zero-sum game, without understanding all of the tools of the
Creation of Exotic Financing Devices (Oct. 1, 1990) (unpublished manuscript on file at Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review).
27. See infra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text. A mortgage is a written instrument
creating an interest in real property to secure repayment of a debt. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 911 (5th ed. 1979).
30. See infra notes 76-97 and accompanying text.
31. A priority mortgage is one that is validly recorded and given priority in a foreclosure
action over subsequent debt interests or later recorded mortgages, thus giving to the priority
mortgagee the first or superior interest in the security, the land. See G. NELSON & D. WHIT-
MAN, REAL ESTATE FiNANCE LAW §§ 9.1-.7 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing creditors' priorities in
bankruptcy and foreclosure). For further discussion of foreclosure and its impact on the rights
and remedies of the other creditors, see infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 76-97 and accompanying text. The issue of why lenders take collateral
or perfect a security interest in assets, real or personal, however, is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a discussion of that issue, see Scott, supra note 5, at 945.
January 1991]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
game available to the players.33
III. REAL PROPERTY SECURED DEBT: ANOTHER
PIECE OF THE PUZZLE
A. Real Property Security Interests Are More Efficient Security
Interests Than Their Personal Property Correlatives
Debtors have many choices with respect to financing options and
frequently use real property secured financing rather than personal prop-
erty secured financing because real property secured financing is more
advantageous to both the debtor and the creditor.34 Real property secur-
ity is easy to monitor. Therefore, the cost of this type of financing is
usually less than the cost of the debtors' other options.31 Further, credi-
tors who take security interests in real property are primarily interested
in the value of the debtors' land, as opposed to debtors' businesses. 36 As
a result, real property secured creditors are less likely to involve them-
selves in debtors' businesses.37 Thus, debtors who have accrued signifi-
cant equity in their real property, should attempt to finance the growth
of their businesses by mortgaging their real property. In this way, debt-
ors can preserve their businesses while securing their debts with real
property. It is only when the equity in their real property is either insuf-
ficient or nonexistent that debtors should turn to other financing alterna-
tives, such as a relational financing arrangement, to finance the growth
and development of their businesses.38
1. The monitoring advantages of real property secured debt
The creditor's ability to monitor debtor behavior and thereby avoid
the consequences of debtor misbehavior is an important factor in estab-
lishing the price of credit to the debtor.39 The most efficient and practi-
cal security device from a monitoring perspective, and hence the cheapest
and most advantageous to the debtor,' is generally the real property
33. For a discussion of the zero-sum game approach to secured debt, see supra notes 16-18
and accompanying text.
34. The use of real property secured debt should not be taken lightly, however, because the
initial use of real property secured debt has the practical disadvantage of preventing the later
use of real property secured debt in potentially advantageous situations. See infra notes 82-87
and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
39. See Levmore, supra note 5, at 50.
40. Id. at 51.
[V/ol. 24:335
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mortgage.41 Unlike other forms of security, the real property mortgage
has one overwhelming monitoring advantage: the land securing the debt
is immobile. It is, therefore, relatively easy to monitor visually the asset
for debtor misbehavior that affects the physical characteristics of the
asset.42
The two most important types of debtor misbehavior that the credi-
tor must monitor for and guard against are conversion and risk altera-
tion. 3 Real property secured debt provides monitoring advantages in
these areas as well. For example, if the creditor utilizes real property
secured debt, it is very difficult for the debtor to convert the security
interest, the land, for the benefit of the debtor. This is because the opera-
tion and relative efficiency of the land title recording system,' and the
immobility of the asset itself affords the creditor significant protection.
By properly using the recording system in the state in which the land is
located, creditors can achieve priority over any subsequent creditors with
respect to their interest in the property and, more importantly, prevent
the sale or conversion of the property to a bona fide purchaser for value
without their consent.45
Similarly, creditors using a conventional mortgage with a due-on
clause,46 can prevent risk alteration, such as a reduction of the loan-to-
41. From a pure monitoring perspective, perhaps the most efficient security device for
creditors is physical receipt and control of the asset; in other words, creditors literally hold the
security hostage. See W. WALSH, A TREATISE ON MORTGAGES § 1, at 1 (1934). However,
this arrangement is often impractical. If the asset that serves as security, such as equipment or
inventory, must be used by the debtor in his business, giving the creditor possession of the asset
as security defeats the purpose of the loan. See A. ScHwARTz & R. ScOTr, supra note 17, at
716-17. In almost all conceivable commercial arrangements, delivering assets to the secured
creditor to be held hostage as security for the debt will be impracticable, if not impossible. Id.
In addition, certain assets that may be used to secure the debt, like land or the goodwill of the
business, may be incapable of reduction to corporeal possession by the creditor. Id.
42. In rare circumstances involving waterfront land, through the use of the property doc-
trines of accretion and avulsion, such property's boundaries can be affected, resulting in a
larger or smaller parcel of property. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 564 (2d ed.
1988). But even this rare and limited change in the nature of the security should not be char-
acterized as moving the real property, or at least not voluntary movement controlled by the
debtor.
43. Levmore, supra note 5, at 51-52. Conversion occurs when people involved in manage-
ment of a firm take company assets and use them for their own benefit. Id. at 52. Risk altera-
tion occurs when debtors switch to riskier business strategies after the loans are finalized. Id.
44. For a discussion of the land title recording system, see J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER,
supra note 42, at 690-96.
45. Id. at 589-601.
46. A due-on-sale clause, or more appropriately a due-on clause (because it includes a due-
on-encumbrance as well as a due-on-sale clause), "is a device commonly used in real property
security transactions to provide, at the option of the lender, for acceleration of the maturity of
the loan upon the sale, alienation or further encumbering of the real property security." Wel-
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value ratio47 or the equity-to-value ratio48 on the premises. Thus, it is
extremely unlikely that a debtor will be able to switch to a riskier busi-
ness strategy that will impact the value of the security interest.49 Real
property, therefore, provides a security interest that requires little, if any,
monitoring, yet grants the secured creditor all the advantages that the
most active and efficient monitoring can provide. These advantages en-
able the creditor to charge a lower interest rate on the debt.
A creditor cannot achieve comparable advantages with a perfected
security interest"° in the debtor's accounts receivables. This is true even
though the creditor can record its perfected security interest giving no-
tice to the world of its interest and, as a result, prevent a subsequent
purchaser of the secured account receivables from acquiring bona fide
purchaser status."1 The primary advantage of acquiring a perfected se-
curity interest in real property secured debt is the static nature of the
underlying security which acts to stabilize the value of the security inter-
est. With personal property secured debt, a subsequent purchaser may
not be interested in acquiring the benefits of a bona fide purchaser and
may acquire the secured assets notwithstanding the perfected and re-
lenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 946 n.1, 582 P.2d 970, 971 n.1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379,
380 n.1 (1978); see also G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 31, § 5.21 (discussing due-on-
sale clauses).
47. Loan-to-value is the percentage which expresses the amount of the loan when com-
pared to the appraised or accepted value of the property. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 845
(5th ed. 1979). Thus, if a conventional mortgage of $75,000 is made on property appraised at
$100,000, the loan-to-value ratio is 75%.
48. Equity-to-value ratio is the flip side of the loan-to-value ratio; it is merely one way to
express the debtor's equity in the premises as a percentage of the appraised or agreed upon
value of the mortgaged premises. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, if
the total amount of the debt secured by mortgages on property appraised at $100,000 is
$75,000, the equity-to-value ratio is 25%.
49. It is possible that some business debtors will take firm-specific risks with the property
that potentially have the effect of reducing the real property's value. This might occur if the
debtor is allowed to use the borrowed assets to alter its business in a manner which has poten-
tial for increasing the value of the property only if that particular debtor remains in business or
is successful. If the assets are used for reasons that are indigenous and unique to the debtor,
the value of the real property security may not be increased and may, in fact, decline. The
creditor can, however, control his firm-specific risk by drafting certain clauses in the mortgage
or by using a method of disbursement similar to that used in construction contracts. See G.
OSBORNE, G. NELON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 12.10 (1979). More-
over, a loan which has no positive impact on the value of the secured premises is, from a risk
perspective, more like a personal property security interest than a conventional real property
security interest. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
50. A security interest is perfected when it has attached and all the steps required for
perfection have been taken. U.C.C. § 9-303 (1989); see also §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, 9-306
(steps required for perfection).
51. Bona fide purchaser status is limited to persons who purchase for value, in good faith,
and without notice of any adverse claim. Id. § 8-302.
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corded security interest. When the debtor and subsequent purchaser deal
in such illegal transactions, the value of the security interest becomes de
minimis if it cannot be located. A personal property security interest
cannot be located if the person who acquired the property has moved it
and the debtor either cannot or will not reveal the identity or location of
the assets.
2. Additional advantages of real property secured debt as contrasted
with other financing devices
If available, creditors may prefer to secure the debt with real prop-
erty irrespective of the monitoring advantages or the type of activity be-
ing financed. For example, assume that the creditor extends debt for the
purchase of personal items that in no way improve the value of the re-
alty.52 The creditor can choose from a number of financing options.
First, the creditor can remain unsecured. Clearly this is an untenable
position in the world of secured credit because a subsequent creditor, or
an earlier creditor using a floating lien53 may take a security interest in
the debtor's assets, including the assets purchased with funds provided
by the unsecured creditor. In the event of debtor insolvency, the secured
creditors would have priority over the unsecured creditor. Thus, the
creditor should take a security interest in the personal or real property of
the debtor.
Assuming the availability of real property secured debt, the follow-
ing section examines and compares various financing arrangements to
determine whether real property secured debt is a viable substitute for
personal property secured debt.54
a. a real property security interest versus a purchase
money security interest
One way in which the creditor can secure the debt is by taking a
purchase money security interest 5 in personal property. The creditor
can obtain a security interest in the assets being purchased and can at-
tempt to perfect a purchase money security interest in those assets.56 In
so doing, the creditor obtains an interest in the assets superior to any
52. For a discussion of real property loans that increase the value of the property to reflect
the capitalization provided by the loan, see infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 22.
54. If the creditor has enough leverage to obtain a real property secured debt, it is assumed
that the creditor will be able to extract a security interest in the debtor's personal property
assets.
55. See U.C.C. § 9-107.
56. See id. § 9-312(3), (4).
January 1991]
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other lienor,57 including a lienor who has the benefit of a floating lien."8
Secured creditors collateralize the loans they make in order to ob-
tain a psychological and actual advantage over the debtor leverage)59
and to ensure that the debtor does not engage in misbehavior (monitor-
ing).O However, both the monitoring role served by secured credit and
the psychological advantage achieved by the creditor over the debtor
would be greatly enhanced by the use of a real property security interest.
By taking an interest in their debtors' equity in real property, creditors
increase their negotiating position vis-a-vis their debtors. 1 Similarly, by
using a conventional mortgage, creditors can ensure that debtors will not
engage in any subsequent real property financing that could potentially
jeopardize the value of their security interest. 2 In addition, the monitor-
ing function most creditors perform would be increased by supervision of
the debtors' real property. Hence, shrewd creditors should be interested
in obtaining a real property security interest in their debtors' property in
order to maintain greater monitoring presence over the relevant activities
of the debtors.
57. See id. § 9-312(3), (5).
58. The traditional rationale for the grant of this "super-priority" status to a lienor who
perfects a purchase money security interest in personal property, is that the purchase money
creditor brings new money into a faltering business. See Scott, supra note 5, at 961.64. Profes-
sor Scott illustrates that this rationale may not be correct in light of relational financing theory.
See id Scott argues that there are two reasons why the Uniform Commercial Code may grant
this super-priority status to the purchase money creditor: First, due to the innate conservatism
of an original creditor holding a floating lien and the fixed rate of return it receives on the
investment, the original creditor has no incentive to finance new and risky ventures. Id. at
962-63. Purchase money financing offers an "escape hatch" to the debtor to finance prospects
that may have a positive value to the firm without negatively impacting the original creditor's
security interest in preexisting secured assets. Second, the purchase money creditor brings his
unique and complementary skills to the venture, which benefits all concerned parties. Id. at
963-64. Theoretically, the general financier secured by the floating lien would agree ex ante to
subordinate his interest to bring the purchase money creditor's unique skills to the venture.
Id Presumably, the parties are unable to reach this agreement ex post due to strategic bar-
gaining (bluffing) so the Uniform Commercial Code provides the parties with the efficient
mechanism of trumping. Id
59. Scott, supra note 5, at 945.
60. Id. at 946-47.
61. The creditor's leverage increases because the debtor presumably has more equity in the
real property which secures the debt than in the personal property which would otherwise
secure the debt. Thus, the debtor has more incentive to comply with the terms of the financing
agreement.
62. Most personal property secured creditors, by failing to insure that the debtor will not
engage in a subsequent real estate secured financing venture with another creditor, imperil
perhaps the most valuable asset owned by the debtor-the land.
THE SECURED FINANCING PUZZLE
b. a real property security interest versus an Article 9 floating lien
A creditor considering extending credit to a debtor who has no sig-
nificant preexisting secured debts has the option of seeking a floating
lien." An Article 9 floating lien permits the creditor to take a security
interest in all of the debtor's currently held or after-acquired assetsf" A
floating lien, however, establishes a complex and costly arrangement be-
tween the debtor and the creditor.
From the debtor's perspective, the primary disadvantage of an Arti-
cle 9 floating lien is the loss of control. By granting a creditor a floating
lien, the debtor grants the creditor exclusive control over the financing of
the debtor's business venture.6 More fundamentally, however, the
debtor gives up a certain degree of control over basic business decisions
by granting a creditor a floating lien. A floating lien permits the creditor
to in effect hold the debtor's assets hostage. This gives the creditor the
power to force its business judgment on the debtor.6
Similarly, the floating lien has many disadvantages for the creditor.
For example, many creditors lack the expertise or desire to engage in
relational financing. More importantly, many creditors may not wish to
engage in operational control over the debtor's business operation67 be-
cause of the possibility of legal liabilities that such a creditor may incur.68
For example, legal liability may be incurred under federal bankruptcy
law, securities law and under common law tort theories. 69 Thus, Article
9 floating liens are only effective and efficient in those situations involving
long-term financing arrangements requiring the creditor to maintain ex-
clusive control of the debtor's business in order to optimally finance
63. See Coogan, supra note 22, at 839-50.
64. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1).
65. Scott, supra note 5, at 956-57.
66. Professor Scott illustrates this point:
By taking an interest that wraps around the debtor's business, the [creditor] gains
important influence over the debtor's strategic planning and operational decision
making. The creditor's power comes from the ability to veto any proposed actions by
withdrawing either financing or assets from the enterprise. A floating lien.., gives
the creditor the power both to seize the debtor's assets ... and to terminate the
financing necessary for the operation of the business. This power to "turn off the
spigot" permits quick, decisive responses to the threat of disfavored behavior. As
with any lever, the power to prevent a disfavored action generates the power to com-
pel a second, desired action.
Id. at 926-27.
67. Although the holder of a floating lien may not wish to engage in operational control of
the debtor's business, it must do so to protect its security interest. The creditor must monitor
the debtor's day-to-day business operations to ensure that the assets, for example accounts
receivables, are sufficient to cover the debt.
68. Scott, supra note 5, at 934.
69. Id.
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growth opportunities.7"
A loan secured by real property avoids the disadvantages of the
floating lien. From the debtor's perspective, real property secured debt is
more advantageous because the creditor is interested in the value of the
land, rather than the debtor's business. Thus, the creditor is less likely to
become involved in the debtor's business.7
A real property security interest is also more advantageous from the
creditor's perspective. As long as the creditor engages in the typical
mortgage transaction-real property secured debt-the creditor exhibits
no control over the operation of the debtor's business. Therefore, the
debtor and the creditor would not be in a joint venture relationship, and
the creditor would run little risk of being characterized as an insider and
exposing itself to the ensuing potential liabilities.72
70. Advantages exist for a small firm that engages in relational financing. Professor Scott
uses the following hypothetical to illustrate that certain relational secured financing devices
provide the optimal method to finance growth prospects in a small firm: Dunning Cabinet
Company, a company that manufactures television cabinets, needs $500,000 to finance a new
addition to the company's single-story plant in order to double its production capacity. The
proposed expansion by Dunning Cabinet Company is defined as "a firm specific opportunity";
that is, if the opportunity is not developed the firm cannot "sell" any rights in the prospect to
third parties. Yet the firm can, in effect, sell the development rights to prospective lenders.
Scott, supra note 5, at 917.
In the relational model it is more advantageous for the debtor to grant exclusive control
over financing the investment to one single creditor for the optimal development of the growth
opportunity. Id. at 918. In exchange for financing the growth opportunity, the creditor re-
ceives a premium above the competitive rate of return on all loans committed to the project.
Id. The debtor company agrees to pay this premium in exchange for the financier's exclusive
financial management "and other inputs necessary for optimal development of the prospect."
Id. As a result of this relational arrangement, both parties act as though they own all of the
property rights in the venture. Id. By utilizing an Article 9 floating lien to secure the bank's
debt, see U.C.C. § 9-204, the debtor and the creditor have entered into a relational contract
that maximizes the potential for optimal development of any potential growth opportunity.
Scott, supra note 5, at 919.
71. This is logical because the value of the creditor's security interest lies in the value of
the land, not in the value of the business. Consequently, the creditor has no interest in the
financial success of the business and, therefore, has little incentive to provide financial or other
managerial assistance. However, the debtor would lose the benefit of the creditor's expertise.
72. For a discussion of situations in which the mortgagee has exceeded the boundaries of a
normal mortgagor-mortgagee relationship and is deemed to be involved in something akin to a
joint venture relationship with the mortgagor, see Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69
Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968) (lender intimately involved in every stage
of development of construction project of residential dwellings held to be "active participant"
in project and, as a result, liable to plaintiff-home buyers for defects in construction of dwell-
ings). But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3434 (West 1970) (limiting Connor's applicability to certain
defined activity); cf. Rice v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Lake County, 207 So. 2d 22 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that construction lender had implied contrac-
tual duty to inspect premises on behalf of plaintiff because lender charged a fee to plaintiff for
"inspection and supervision"). See generally Gutierrez, Liability of a Construction Lender
THE SECURED FINANCING PUZZLE
Even a relational creditor who already holds a floating lien on the
debtor's assets should establish a security interest in the debtor's realty.
The relational creditor desires exclusive control over the debtor and
seeks to monitor the debtor's activities in order to thwart debtor misbe-
havior.73 By holding both the debtor's real property and the personal
property hostage, the relational creditor can maintain exclusive control
over the debtor's business.
c. a final advantage of real property secured debt
Finally, the most persuasive argument that the real property secur-
ity interest represents an optimal form of security in certain situations is
the fact that even after it has been created, it has no detrimental impact
on the creation of a relational secured financing device. If a relational
contract is desired for later financing opportunities, the floating lien and
other devices are still available to the exclusive financier. This raises the
issue of whether the financier is exclusive if a conventional real estate
mortgage on land already exists. The answer is yes, as long as exclusivity
is measured by the type of security interest created. The creditor can still
achieve exclusivity over the personal property of the debtor through the
use of the floating lien or some other appropriate vehicle.74 Although
exclusivity is unavailable with real property security financing, it is also
unnecessary because of the unique nature of real estate and the devices
the secured mortgagee of real property can utilize to ensure exclusivity
with respect to the real property security interest."
B. Real Property Secured Debt Impacts the Financing
Arrangements Analysis
In an optimal setting, both debtor and creditor prefer real property
secured debt to personal property secured debt, and it is the unavailabil-
ity of this alternative that compels the parties to engage in a relational
financing device. In other words, only when real property secured debt is
Under Civil Code § 3434: An Amorphous Epitaph to Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 8 PAc. L.J. 1 (1977) (analyzing Connor, the legislative response of passing § 3434, and
subsequent case law).
73. Scott, supra note 5, at 916-17.
74. Of course, this exclusivity is subject to a limited number of exceptions including
purchase money security interests. U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4).
75. By using a conventional mortgage, mortgagees can ensure that they maintain their
priority not only as the first mortgagees but as the only mortgagees through the utilization of
due-on clauses which allow mortgagees to accelerate the debt if a mortgagor places a subse-
quent mortgage on the premises without the consent of the original mortgagee. For a discus-
sion of due-on clauses, see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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considered and rejected will the parties turn to such devices as the float-
ing lien.
To test this theory, consider Professor Scott's hypothetical: Dun-
ning Cabinet Company,. a company that manufactures television cabi-
nets, needs $500,000 to finance a new addition to the company's single-
story plant in order to double its production capacity.76 There are three
situations in which it may be inappropriate for the creditor to take a real
property security interest. The first situation exists when the debtor
owns no land by which to secure the debt. This situation is highly un-
likely given the nature of most small businesses. A manufacturing com-
pany like Dunning Cabinet Company presumably owns the land on
which the cabinets are manufactured.77 If the debtor owns no land,
clearly the use of a real property security interest is inappropriate. More-
over, securing a $500,000 line of credit with a floating lien is unadvisable
because the manufacturer has no permanent base of operations.78
More than likely, the problem will not be that the debtor owns no
real estate, but that the debtor does not own enough real property to
support the amount of debt needed to expand the premises. This objec-
tion, however, also seems somewhat chimerical. Even if the land is
worth a nominal amount prior to constructing the expansion-for exam-
ple, $10,000-that fact is irrelevant to the mortgagee because, theoreti-
cally, there should be a dollar-for-dollar increase in the value of the
premises once the addition to the plant is built. It would be a very poor
investment indeed, and one that should not be made, if the value of the
premises after $500,000 is poured into the improvements is less than
$510,000.
79
The second situation in which it may be inappropriate to take a real
76. See supra note 70.
77. However, there are situations where it may be advantageous to a company like Dun-
ning to use a functional equivalent like a long-term lease. For a discussion of long-term leases
and their functional equivalency to mortgages, see Johnson, Correctly Interpreting Long-Term
Leases Pursuant to Modern Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L.
REv. 751, 774-77 (1988).
78. If a long-term lease is used by the debtor, a mortgage can be executed on that interest
as well. See G. NELSON & D. WHIrMAN, supra note 31, §§ 15.12-.13. Hence, ifa mortgage is
unavailable, it is presumably due to the fact that the debtor has no mortgageable assets in real
estate.
79. The term "value" is used loosely in this context. This is not to say that the value of the
land and the improvement itself should total in all instances $510,000 or more. The future
stream of potential income represented by the good will of the business has some positive
impact on the value of the premises. But is that goodwill severable from the asset itself? Even
though this is a firm specific asset, the asset itself, the firm, may be sold or captured by the
creditor in the event of default. For a discussion of the rights of the mortgagee in the event of
default, see J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 42, at 590-99.
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property security interest is where the manufactured product has a value
or an identity which is tied to one individual's unique skill or reputa-
tion."0 That, however, should have no impact on the value of the factory
which is being financed with the proceeds of the debt. Presumably, the
factory will be worth $510,000 to some manufacturer. If, for some rea-
son, the value of the endeavor is tied to other intangible assets, such as
the intelligence or skill of the individual, then no amount of security may
be adequate to totally protect the creditor.8 ' In this type of situation, the
creditor is relying on the individual efforts of the debtor, like a painter
using his best efforts to produce a masterpiece, and is engaging in a true
relational contract.
The third situation occurs when the property is already secured by a
creditor who is in a priority position and unwilling to relinquish that
position. In many situations, an earlier creditor may have forced a new
and struggling business to execute a mortgage to purchase the premises.
The first mortgagee, whose funds typically provide the majority of the
purchase price for the property, may be unwilling to relinquish that lofty
appellation. Nevertheless, for the same reasons that the creditor is will-
ing to make a $500,000 loan on property worth $10,000, the first mortga-
gee should be willing to subordinate his interest to the new loan of
$500,000.82 In a world with no transaction costs and perfect informa-
tion, theoretically, the development of the property should cause the
value of the property to increase, and the first mortgagee's security as a
second mortgagee should be worth more as a result.83 Therefore, a pre-
existing mortgage which has priority should not impede the use of real
80. For example, the products of a famous fashion designer are worth more because of the
identification with that designer's name or style. See E.T.F. Enterprises, Inc. v. Nina Ricci,
S.A.R.L. 523 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 643, 118 N.E.
214 (1917).
81. All endeavors, to some degree, are based on the acumen and skill of the parties in-
volved. However, it is important to distinguish the skills that are easily transferable and for
which there is a market from those that are not easily transferable and for which there is no
market. It may be difficult, if not impossible, to predict a designer's future designs in advance
notwithstanding the number and value of security interests used to secure the creditor's posi-
tion. If a designer refuses to develop new designs, the creditor win lose its investment.
82. Subordination occurs when a secured creditor expressly agrees to subordinate its inter-
est in the security, which is given priority because it was recorded earlier in time, to an inferior
interest for the purpose of giving to the later recorded security interest priority with respect to
that security interest. Subordination agreements are frequently used with construction loans
and other loans by which real property is developed. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D.
WHITMAN, supra note 49, § 12.9.
83. While this type of subordination agreement is commonly used, the theoretical increase
in the value of the security does not always provide sufficient protection to the subordinated
mortgagee. The insufficient protection is caused by this country's inadequate foreclosure sys-
tem. Id. § 7.21.
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property secured debt because the mortgagee should consent to the sub-
ordination of the mortgage.
In light of the above, what stops any creditor, relational or other-
wise, from taking security in the debtor's real property assets? The ad-
vantages seem to outweigh any negative transaction costs associated with
documenting the mortgage. 4 The problem is generally that there is a
preexisting mortgage when the debtor requests the later creditor to ex-
tend funds to the business, and we do not live in a perfect world of no or
even low transaction costs with access to perfect information. The preex-
isting mortgagee has a priority with respect to the security interest"5 that
the mortgagee is not going to relinquish easily. The first mortgagee will
likely have a provision in the mortgage prohibiting the debtor from plac-
ing a subsequent mortgage on the premises without the permission of the
first mortgagee.8 6 That permission may be costly. The prior mortgagee
may engage in strategic bluffing to extract an exorbitant fee to
subordinate its interest to a subsequent creditor.8 7
More importantly, although the use of a second mortgage should
increase the value of the property in excess of the amount of secured
debt, the debtor must demonstrate the value increase in order to obtain
the first mortgagee's assent to the use of a junior security interest. The
only realistic way in which the initial mortgagee can ensure the safety of
its investment is by monitoring the investment of the junior lienor. If the
senior or first mortgagee is forced to monitor the later investment to pro-
tect his earlier investment, he loses the "monitoring advantages" gained
by using a mortgage. The absence of the use of real property secured
debt indicates that the real property is unattainable as a security interest.
The most logical explanation for it being unattainable is that a real prop-
erty security interest is already held by some other advantageous credi-
tor. Thus, in certain situations, the creditor may be unable to get a
security interest in the debtor's real property.
84. The mortgage is a rather standard transaction requiring no significant transaction
costs. See White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV.
473, 490 (1984) (costs of standardized security clauses in loan agreements are de minimis).
The form or off-the-rack provisions can be used by almost all parties. The ease and low cost by
which one can place a mortgage on another's real property supports the notion that such
devices, in the absence of other factors, should be used more often by creditors.
85. This is assuming that the preexisting mortgagee recorded its security interest. See J.
DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 42, at 705-08.
86. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
87. The incremental value of the security provided by a second mortgage may be less than
the cost incurred by the creditor in attempting to obtain the agreement of the first mortgagee
either to consent to the placement of a second mortgage on the property or to subordinate the
first to a second position.
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In sum, the only situation in which a creditor would not take a real
property security interest is when that opportunity is unavailable. Thus,
the fact that mortgages are not used by secured creditors to finance the
expansion of the debtor's business does not indicate that real property
secured debt plays no role in solving the financing puzzle. Rather, real
property security interests have a tremendous impact and influence on
the way personal property secured debt is structured because the pres-
ence of the secured real property creditor motivates totally, or in part,
the subsequent personal property creditor to obtain an exclusive financ-
ing arrangement with respect to the debtor's personal property.
In situations where real property secured debt is unavailable because
a real property security interest is held by another creditor, the financing
creditor should obtain an exclusive financing arrangement not only to
control the actions of the debtor,"8 but also to protect itself from the real
property secured creditor. If financing the creditor fails to protect its
interest in other assets of the debtor, it has allowed those assets to remain
subject to the prior control of the real property secured creditor in the
event of the debtor's default. Often overlooked in discussions of the real
property secured creditor's rights upon foreclosure is the fact that the
creditor has two methods of collecting the debt which the real property
secures. The real property secured creditor may foreclose upon the real
property.9 Alternatively, the real property secured creditor, like any
other creditor, may sue and get a judgment at law on the obligation and
enforce this judgment by levy upon any property, including personalty,
owned by the debtor.90 More importantly, in most jurisdictions, the
creditor may pursue these remedies consecutively or concurrently. 91
To protect its position, the financing creditor must protect itself
from the real property secured creditor's security interest, which in the
event of the debtor's default, has the potential of absorbing the personal
assets of the debtor to the detriment of the financing creditor. If a subse-
quent creditor does not take any security, the real property secured credi-
tor may be the largest unsecured creditor at the time of a debtor's default
or bankruptcy and, as a result, is entitled to the majority of the debtor's
unsecured assets.92
This raises the interesting question of why the first creditor, the real
88. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
89. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 31, § 8.1.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. As the creditor to whom the largest amount is owed, the real property creditor will be
entitled to unsecured assets proportionate to his claim.
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property secured creditor, would allow the debtor the freedom to pledge
other assets to subsequent creditors. Would the wise creditor obtain the
real property security interest and a floating lien on the personal assets?
It likely has something to do with cost and the role that monitoring plays
in secured transactions.93 By holding the debtor's real property as secur-
ity, with all the attendant monitoring advantages that accrue, 94 it may be
inefficient for the creditor to engage in monitoring the debtor's subse-
quently acquired personal property assets.9" In addition, it may not be
cost-effective given the possibility of purchase money security interests
which trump the prior security interest of the real property secured cred-
itor.96 Finally, the cost of obtaining the security interest in personal
property assets may outweigh any benefits. The real property security
interest, along with the creditor's right to stand in line as an unsecured
creditor with respect to the debtor's personal property, may be enough
security to satisfy even the most risk-averse creditor.
Thus, one piece of the secured debt puzzle may, in large part, be
reactive. Personal property secured debt may exist to counteract real
property secured debt. The conventional mortgage, by which the credi-
tor takes a security interest in the land purchased by the debtor, is in-
grained in our society. 97 As a reaction to this scenario, subsequent
creditors protect their positions by taking security in other assets of the
debtor.
Perhaps it is only when real property secured debt is eliminated that
other forms of secured financing, including personal property secured
debt, likewise will be eliminated. In examining the present secured debt
puzzle, however, the puzzle must be expanded to include real property
secured debt. Without considering real property secured debt, the puzzle
is incomplete and impossible to solve.
IV. REAL ESTATE FINANCING ILLUMINATES THE BENEFITS OF ALL
SECURITY INTERESTS
A. The Social and Economic Costs of Security
Scholars researching the role and function of secured debt make
much of the fact that the creation of a security interest, real or personal,
93. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role monitoring
plays in secured transactions.
94. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
96. The purchase money security interest has priority over the prior-in-time floating lien.
See U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4).
97. See G. NELsON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 31, § 1.1.
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is not costless. Although there is some dispute regarding whether that
cost is de minimi, 98 there is unanimity that creating a security interest
imposes some cost on the debtor.9 9 The cost of security, coupled with
the conclusion'that secured credit is a zero-sum game"°° have led some
analysts to conclude that "[s]ince setting up security arrangements is
costly, the debtor's total credit bill-consisting of both secured and un-
secured credit charges-may be greater under a regime of secured credit
than in a world where security is prohibited."' '1 In other words, is a
system disallowing secured debt that would require that all creditors
share pro rata in the debtor's assets in the event of insolvency better than
one in which secured and unsecured debt are allowed to exist
simultaneously?102
This question has led to a plethora of articles analyzing the role of
secured credit and the law's preference for secured debt within and with-
out bankruptcy.10 3 Thus, conventional efficiency theorists explained that
high risk debtors grant creditors security because it increased the amount
of debt available to them at lower interest rates than would otherwise be
available. Creditors took security because it enabled them to issue credit
while minimizing their risks." 
°
Professor Schwartz exposed a flaw in the conventional efficiency the-
ory. Professor Schwartz argued that secured debt was actually a zero-
sum game by which the costs incurred by unsecured creditors offset the
benefits which accrued to secured creditors. 05 Similarly, Professor
Schwartz argued that the higher interest rates debtors had to pay for
their unsecured debt'06 offset the savings debtors realized from the lower
secured debt interest rates.'0 7 Professor Scott expanded on Professor
Schwartz' zero-sum hypothesis by noting that debtors' total credit bill
could actually increase in a secured debt system due to the transaction
98. White, supra note 84, at 489-91.
99. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 7.
100. Gains to those creditors who accept security are created only by inflicting losses on
those creditors who do not take security. Id at 10-11, 18-21 (monitoring costs and security
interests are inversely related).
101. Scott, supra note 5, at 902.
102. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1147.
103. See supra note 5.
104. See, eg., J. VAN HORNE, supra note 12, at 536.
105. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 7-11, 18-21.
106. Unsecured creditors charge higher rates not only to compensate for the risks of debtor
default, but also to compensate for the inferior positions in bankruptcy of unsecured creditors
vis-a-vis secured creditors. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 7.
107. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 7-11, 18-21.
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costs of creating security interests.108
These conclusions led monitorists 09 and relationalists" ° to attempt
to alter the sum of the zero-sum game by introducing a previously ig-
nored piece of the puzzle."' 1 These theorists attempted to demonstrate
that security and secured debt were efficient because they provided a ben-
efit that outweighed the costs of establishing a security interest.
112
Prior attempts to justify secured debt in light of Schwartz' conclu-
sions may have been too narrow. By focusing on the costs of credit and
the alleged offsetting benefits created in the debtor-creditor relation-
ship,1 3 analysts have failed to consider the exogenous benefits gained by
secured credit arrangements. These benefits, to a limited degree, explain
the puzzle of secured debt.
B. Exogenous Benefits Created by Secured Debt
By limiting their analyses to the debtor-creditor relationships, schol-
ars have lost sight of important facts that may explain, in part, the func-
tion of secured debt. Creditors and debtors take many shapes and forms.
The creditor may be one individual or may represent a corporation or a
joint venture." 4 Analysts have ignored the different types of creditors
or, more accurately, the composition of the creditor and how that com-
position impacts the role of secured debt.
The composition of the creditor is important because of the transac-
tion costs involved in imparting information to large numbers of the
creditor's investors. Secured debt is efficient because it serves as a vehicle
to impart information while minimizing transaction costs. 1" Examining
the identity of the debtor and the identity of the creditor, as opposed to
treating the debtor-creditor relationship as uniform and stagnant, is ben-
eficial in resolving the secured debt puzzle.
1 16
108. Scott, supra note 5, at 902. But see White, supra note 84, at 489-91 (arguing that the
cost of creating security interest was de minimis in many cases).
109. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
111. See, eg., Jackson & Kromnan, supra note 1 (monitorist theory); Scott, supra note 5
(relationalist theory).
112. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. Whether these efforts have been suc-
cessful is the subject of some dispute and is beyond the scope of this Article.
113. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
114. See Goldstein, Loan Structures and Third Party Problems, in ASSET-BASED LENDING
INCLUDING COMMERCIAL FINANCE AND ACQuIsION FINANCING 333, 335-57 (Practicing
Law Institute Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook No. 483, 1989).
115. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
116. Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1067-68
(1984).
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The identity of the creditor may partially determine whether secur-
ity is needed and efficient given the signaling role that security may
play. 117 As the increasing securitization of real property security inter-
ests proves, security serves as an important and efficient vehicle for pool-
ing assets and reducing transaction costs in certain commonplace
situations. Certainly there are short-term costs to the creation of security
interests, but are these costs not outweighed by the long-term benefits?
Consider the Dunning Cabinet Company hypothetical118 to illus-
trate the efficiency of secured real property debt and the importance of
the composition of the creditor. Assume Dunning needs $500,000 to ex-
pand its plant in order to increase its production of television cabinets.
Further, assume an economic system that prohibits the use of security
interests. In this system, Dunning should prefer to obtain the entire
amount of its present financing needs from one creditor because the
transaction costs incurred by dealing with one creditor are less than
those incurred by dealing with several creditors." 9 If that individual
creditor has $500,000 and is willing to lend it to Dunning, Dunning will
be satisfied. If the credit extended is owned in full by the creditor, the
creditor can evaluate the risk adequately to protect its interest. If, how-
ever, a percentage of the creditor's investment were owned by someone
else, problems would arise and transaction costs would increase. If we
assume that the $500,000 to be extended to Dunning represented five
equal shares of $100,000, five separate approvals would be needed before
the transaction could be completed.
First, the lead creditor,12° acting as broker, would have to deal with
Dunning and learn enough about Dunning's business venture to deter-
mine whether Dunning and the venture were worth the risk of extending
credit. Second, the lead creditor or the debtor would have to convince
each investor of the credit-worthiness of the arrangement. In a "no se-
curity" system, the only way to assure investors of the safety of their
investment would be to explain fully to each investor Dunning's history
and its present proposed venture.12 1 The transaction costs involved in
117. For a discussion of signaling, see Schwartz, supra note 5, at 14-21.
118. See supra note 70.
119. In addition, Professor Scott illustrates that Dunning, in certain situations, should try
to provide not only for its current needs, but also for its future needs through relational financ-
ing. See Scott, supra note 5, at 928.
120. This assumes some mechanism by which one creditor emerges as the lead creditor. In
the absence of such a mechanism, the creditors would have no incentive to pool their assets
because they would all have to act as individual lead creditors and transaction costs would
increase.
121. The more discretion each investor grants the lead creditor to make decisions to invest
funds unilaterally in speculative ventures, the more risk the individual investor takes with
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such an effort would be substantial.
Obtaining adequate security would resolve these coordination
problems and reduce transaction costs. Security, such as secured real
property, serves as a signal, not only to creditors but also to investors of
the creditors, of the credit-worthiness of the debtor and the safety of the
investment. 122 Thus, by using security, investors gain the ability to pool
their resources efficiently. 2 ' Security solves some of the problems cre-
ated in the real world by reducing externalities, solving imperfections in
information, and resolving coordination problems. 2 4 This is achieved
because security, such as secured real property, serves as a signaling de-
vice, not only to creditors, but also to investors of lead creditor.
The fact that security serves as a signal is not new. In his seminal
article which motivated many to attempt to unravel the secured debt
puzzle, Professor Schwartz noted that one explanation for the existence
of security is the so-called signaling function by which the debtor signals
the creditor that the debtor is a worthwhile risk. 125 The signaling theory
has been attacked, however, as being counter-intuitive 26---once creditors
possess all information necessary to convince them of the worth of the
security, they no longer need the security to convince them of the credit-
worthiness of the debtor.'
27
Traditional signaling theory is counter-intuitive because it misidenti-
fies the recipient of the signal. By focusing instead on the investors of the
lead creditor as the recipients of the signal, coordination, information
respect to the security of the investment. While economic efficiency can be gained by relying
on the expertise of the lead creditor, problems arise in determining how to verify the lead
creditor's expertise. One way to establish the expertise of the lead creditor would be to focus
on past successes. Competition among lead creditors should weed out poor and inept lead
creditors and reward efficient lead creditors. This theory, however, would require that all
investors have access to all relevant information about the lead creditor in a timely fashion.
This theory would not sufficiently account for information imperfections, coordination
problems or other costly externalities.
For a discussion of efficiency rationales for inalienability rules based on market failures
that arise because of the presence of externalities, imperfections in information or problems of
coordination (along with definitions of these terms) see Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 938, 942, 950 (1985).
122. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
124. For a further discussion of the difficulties caused by externalities, imperfections in in-
formation and coordination problems, see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 121.
125. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 14.
126. White, supra note 84, at 477.
127. Id. Of course, there are other reasons to take security, such as to hold the debtor's
assets hostage to force repayment. See supra note 25. Alternatively, security may be taken to
monitor the activity of the debtor to ensure that there is no subsequent debtor misbehavior that
impacts the investment. See supra notes 19-20, 39-51 and accompanying text.
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and externality problems are resolved because the lead creditor uses the
security not to determine the credit-worthiness of the debtor, but as a
signal to inform and placate investors of the lead creditor that their in-
vestments are worth the risk. First, the investors of the lead creditor use
the signal as an efficient way to ensure that the debtor is worth the risk of
the investment.128 Second, investors of the lead creditor use the security
signal as an efficient way to monitor the lead creditor.12 9
1. The efficiency of security as a signal to investors of the credit
worthiness of the debtor and the safety of the investment
In determining whether to extend credit, the lead creditor negotiates
with the debtor and acquires all relevant information to determine the
credit-worthiness of both the debtor and the debtor's proposed ven-
ture.130 If that same information had to be imparted to one hundred
investors who also had to be convinced of the credit-worthiness of the
debtor, significant transaction costs would be incurred.
In a secured debt system, the lead creditor determines the value of
the security and uses the security to signal the investors, who have
pooled their assets, regarding the credit worthiness of the venture.' To
avoid higher transaction costs-the costs incurred by the lead creditor in
explaining in great detail the basis for the lead creditor's determination of
the credit-worthiness of the debtor-the security interest serves as a
short-hand method of signaling the investors of the worth of their invest-
ment. By using this signal, creditors avoid coordination problems and
their ensuing transaction costs.
Creditors also avoid informational problems by relying on the se-
cured debt signal. If the investors and the lead creditor agree on the
nature of the investment and the security to be received ex ante, the re-
ceipt of the security interest may serve to impart correct and timely in-
formation to the investors. 132 Similarly, if each investor must approve
the activities of the lead creditor ex post, the security may serve as a
signal of the credit-worthiness of the debtor, thereby allowing the inves-
tors quick and easy access to relevant information about the decision of
the lead creditor.
128. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
130. D. EpwIN, DEBTOR-CREDrOR LAW 82-83 (1985).
131. Goldstein, supra note 114, at 342-44.
132. This information ensures that the loan is "safe." Of course, subsequent events may
reduce the value of security. Presumably, however, the lead creditor has taken precautions
against this.
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Hence, security serves as a signaling device to investors of the lead
creditor and as an efficacious way of reducing transaction costs by im-
parting relevant information efficiently to investors of the lead creditor.
Through this signaling process, investors with different levels of risk
averseness are able to pool their assets and minimize transaction costs for
the purpose of making investments that match the level of the risk they
are willing to assume. Security serves as a short-hand symbol by which
transaction costs are reduced because opportunity-specific information
about the credit arrangement does not have to be conveyed from the lead
creditor to investors.
To be effective, however, the cost of obtaining and using the signal
must not exceed the incremental benefit attributable to the security in its
signaling function. 133 Thus, requiring the lead creditor to explain and
validate the accuracy or strength of the signal, lessens the value of the
signal. Any saving that accrues to the lead creditor by using security as a
signal to its investors would be lost if the lead creditor had to explain the
worth of the investment. The lead creditor and the investors should
agree ex ante to the type of security which will be accepted in exchange
for the amount of risk to be taken by investors.
Ex ante agreement between the lead creditor and the individual in-
vestor as to the type of security resolves this problem, particularly if the
signal is readily receivable by the investors of the lead creditor. Security
that cannot be verified, or that can be verified only by the individual
investor's independent investigation may be worth no more than having
no signal. If the parties to a transaction have to take action to verify the
worth of the security, the cost of obtaining it has increased. This may be
why more credit-worthy debtors give more and better security than their
less able counterparts. The strength and easy recognition of the signal
allows debtors a comparative advantage in the marketplace which they
should exploit to obtain cheaper credit.
Thus, even though lead creditors "(i) can learn of and react to the
existence of security; (ii) can calculate risks of default reasonably pre-
cisely; (iii) are risk-neutral; and (iv) have homogenous expectations re-
specting default probabilities," 134 the costs of conveying all of this
information to the investors may outweigh the advantages of the signal-
133. If security serves a risk reduction function, the interest rate of secured debt should be
less than the interest rate of unsecured debt. But if there is another function, that fact should
also be reflected in the cost of security. There should be some correlation between the strength
of the signal and the reduction of the risk. In addition, there should be some correlation
between the ease of verification of the strength of the signal and the lower transaction costs
that result from the strength of the signal.
134. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 7.
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ing function of secured debt. By creating secured debt, the lead creditor
may be imparting this same information to its investors at a lower cost
than actually transmitting the information to the investors of the credi-
tors, thus providing part of the missing link in the secured debt puzzle.
2. Security as a Signal Used by Investors To Monitor the Behavior of
. Lead Creditors
Coordination problems may develop if individual investors are not
able to monitor adequately the actions of the lead creditor. In the ab-
sence of signaling, investors who would benefit from the coordinated ac-
tion of pooling their resources, may be dissuaded from doing so because
they fear lead creditor misbehavior. Security may be required by inves-
tors of the lead creditor and used as a device to monitor and limit the
misbehavior on the part of the lead creditor vis-a-vis the investors.
135
The lead creditor occupies a very advantageous position in dealing with
the debtor. The investors must rely on the lead creditor's efforts in plac-
ing their investment in a beneficial manner given the parameters estab-
lished by the relationship. 36 That reliance on the lead creditor's efforts
could lead to numerous problems given the nature of the relationship.
137
First, the lead creditor could engage in opportunistic behavior and
deprive the investors of an attractive investment opportunity.1 38 There
135. Security's function of monitoring the lead creditor may explain why security is some-
times required of even the most credit-worthy debtors. Thus, while taking a security interest
in the assets of a "super-solvent" and well-known debtor may appear inefficient because the
investors are virtually assured of repayment; the security fulfills a function quite apart from
ensuring repayment-the security serves as a signal to monitor the lead creditor for
misbehavior.
136. Goldstein, supra note 114, at 338-41.
137. In fact, the lead creditor-investor relationship arguably is a relational contract. As
such, there may be a need for security between the parties to that relationship, although it does
not rise to the level of a floating lien. See Scott, supra note 5, at 919.
138. See Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. Rv. 521,
521-26 (1981). In an exceptional article, Professor Muris demonstrates that certain legal prin-
ciples, particula ly implied terms in contracts such as the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, are low-cost methods of deterring costly opportunistic behavior. Id. at 522. Op-
portunistic behavior is defined as behavior of a performing party to an agreement that is "con-
trary to the other party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the
agreement's explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party to the per-
former." Id. at 521. More importantly, such behavior is often costly to detect and, as a result,
costly to deter. Id. at 522. Hence, the focus in Muris' article is on the methods used to
control opportunistic behavior which is ambiguous in character and exceedingly difficult to
detect. Id. Opportunistic behavior is behavior which is not prohibited by the contract and
which results in a wealth-transfer from one party to another which was not bargained for. Id.
at 523-24. In one sense, it represents a party's strategic response to a situation that was not
contemplated or anticipated by the parties and which was therefore not addressed in the agree-
ment between the parties. Id. at 524. Thus, no express breach of the contract necessarily
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are two guards against this: one is the public nature of security, and the
other is the size of the investment opportunity. Perfection of the security
interest will normally involve the filing of some public document.1 39 If
the lead creditor takes security while engaging in opportunistic behavior
to the detriment of the investors, the filing of its security interest will
impart notice to concerned investors.
If the lead creditor does not perfect a security interest in a public
manner, the creditor's opportunistic behavior may not be discoverable.
Here, however, the pooling-of-assets mechanism may protect the inves-
tors' interests from acts of misfeasance. The parties normally pool their
assets to obtain a favorable arrangement with the debtor. 14° The sheer
size of the investment opportunity sought by investors in such a relation-
ship may prevent odious behavior on the part of the lead creditor because
the lead creditor may have insufficient assets to compete for the same
opportunities as the investment syndicate.
1 41
Another type of behavior that the investors must guard against has
nothing to do with the lead creditor's misappropriation of opportunity;
rather it involves the creditor's misappropriation of the investment.
Here, security plays a crucial role. Through agreements, investors may
condition the release of investor assets upon simultaneous receipt of the
security interest. The real estate mortgage, which is secured by a mort-
gage executed as part of the escrow process,142 provides a perfect
example.
Additionally, security interests are technically limited restraints on
alienation. 43 By taking a security interest in property of the debtor, the
occurs when a party to the contract acts opportunistically. Id. Yet, deterring opportunistic
behavior should be a primary goal of contract law because of the multitude of costs incurred if
opportunistic behavior is not prevented. Id. at 526. Simplistically stated, opportunistic behav-
ior should be deterred because it is not productive and, hence, is not cost efficient. Id.
139. If the security is real property, the security interest must be recorded pursuant to the
jurisdiction's recording act. See J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, supra note 42, at 690-96
(describing the recording system). If the security is personal property, a financing statement
must be properly executed and filed. R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 62-66 (1979).
140. See Goldstein, supra note 114, at 335.
141. Indeed, if the lead creditor has the financial resources to compete with the investment
syndicate that he leads, there is no reason for the lead creditor to pool investors' funds. Addi-
tionally, as a matter of public policy, the lead creditor should drop the investment syndicate if
an irrefutable conflict of interest exists between the interest of the lead creditor and the individ-
ual investors.
142. Escrow is "a system of document transfer in which a deed, bond, or funds is delivered
to a third person to hold until all conditions in a contract are fulfilled .... ." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 489 (5th ed. 1979).
143. See Volkmer, The Application of the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property
Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REv. 747 (1973) (setting forth proper judicial approach when
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creditor is restraining the ability of the debtor freely to transfer the as-
sets. 1" Moreover, by taking security, the investors are in a position to
ensure that the lead creditor does not engage in risk-alteration by substi-
tuting a riskier venture for the one approved by the investors.
C. A Proposed Empirical Study
Although the traditional signaling theory has been attacked for lack
of empirical underpinnings,145 empirical information should support the
notion that security, as a signal to the investors of lead creditors, is effi-
cient. An empirical study which focuses on the makeup of the creditor
should show that composition of the creditor is an indicator of the credi-
tor's security requirements. The larger the number of diverse investors,
the more visible security the lead creditor obtains as compared to a lead
creditor acting on behalf of himself or a small number of investors.
Security is given, in part, as a signal to the lead creditor's investors
that the creditor has made a sound investment. The more visible, sol-
vent, secure and respected the debtor, the more valuable the signal. If
security serves as a signal to investors of the merits of their lead credi-
tor's investment, it stands to reason that the strongest corporate debtors
would give the best and strongest signals. A company without a verifia-
ble public track record or with a weak history of credit is in a weaker
position to grant security because the debtor's signal is relatively worth-
less for the purpose that it is being given: to placate the "silent" inves-
tors of the lead creditor. Thus, if the debtor is risky, the odds are that
the signal given to investors will be worthless. Secured debt signals the
risk-averse investor that the investment taken by the lead creditor is a
"good" investment.
Empirical studies should focus on the extent to which the composi-
tion of the creditor determines whether security will be required. The
larger the number of diverse investors, the more security and the more
visible the security the lead creditor obtains. Thus, in the Dunning Cabi-
net Company hypothetical, 46 security may be required if Dunning's lead
restraints on alienation doctrine is asserted as defense against remedies employed by secured
parties in real property secured transactions).
144. Id. at 753.
145. As Professor White states:
[Professor Schwartz's] "signal concept" rests upon empirical assumptions that
are in direct conflict with the typical assumption, namely that debtors who are good
credit risks need not give collateral, while those who are poor risks can procure loans
only if they grant collateral to procure this loan could be an ambiguous signal.
White, supra note 84, at 477 n.10.
146. See supra note 70.
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creditor represents one hundred investors who have invested $1,000 each
with the lead creditor; on the other hand, security may not be required
from a lead creditor who represents five investors who have invested
$100,000 each in the investment.14
V. CONCLUSION
This Article develops a theory of the secured debtor-creditor rela-
tionship that considers the overlooked function of real property secured
debt in these transactions. Analysis of relational contract theory and the
role that monitoring plays in secured debt demonstrates that real prop-
erty secured debt must play a role in solving the secured debt puzzle.
Particularly, the secured debt puzzle consists not only of personal prop-
erty secured debt, but also real property secured debt.
Due to the permanence and immobility of real property, the use of
real property secured debt, if available, should always be preferred over
its personal property counterpart. Moreover, the same attributes that
should cause debtors and creditors to prefer real property security inter-
ests to personal property security interests, should also cause subsequent
creditors, to perfect their interests with subsequent real property security
interests. But if that option is not available, the creditor should employ
the next best alternative: a personal property security interest in the
form of a floating lien, a pledge of assets, or some other security interest.
Accordingly, the use of personal property security interests, in some
limited way, may be protective and reactive, protecting the later creditor
from the advantages conferred upon the earlier real property secured
creditor.
Finally, real property secured debt illuminates another function of
the role of both real property secured debt and personal property secured
debt. Secured debt may serve an important signaling function, but not
between creditor and debtor. The secured debt signal may be used by a
147. The size of the investment will obviously play a role in the degree of risk taken by the
individual investor-creditor. Size of the investment alone may account for some of the inves-
tor's actions in monitoring or approving the actions of the lead creditor. A creditor would
likely monitor a $100,000 investment more closely than a $5,000 investment. However, size of
the investment alone does not determine how the investor decides to invest his money.
Notwithstanding the amount of an investment, the investor must be given adequate informa-
tion relative to the risk assumed. Hence, where the size of the investment is small, an investor
may do something counterintuitive, such as buying blue chip stock, knowing nothing of the
actual status of the company that issued the stock. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 15.4 (1986) (discussing investment decisions of portfolio managers). On the other
hand, a creditor may be more willing to risk a larger investment in a venture, such as a new
restaurant, based on the quality of the chef and the management, which is known personally
by the investor.
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lead creditor and his investors as a method to pool the resources of risk-
averse investors efficiently by reducing transaction costs. It also repre-
sents a way of cheaply monitoring the behavior of the lead creditor.
Once it is recognized that the lead creditor is not acting in a self-inter-
ested fashion, it is relatively easy to see that a mechanism by which the
lead creditor may efficiently pool and manage the assets of his investors is
necessary. Security, be it personal or real, plays a very important role in
this process.
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